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WARFIELD ON DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND 
HUMAN FREEDOM
Peter A. Graham
Warfi eld (1997, 2000) argues that divine foreknowledge and human freedom 
are compatible. He assumes for conditional proof that there is a necessarily 
existent omniscient being. He also assumes that it is possible for there to be a 
person who both does something and could have avoided doing it. As sup-
port for this latt er premise he points to the fact that nearly every participant 
to the debate accepts the falsity of logical fatalism. Appealing to this consen-
sus, however, renders the argument question-begging, for that consensus has 
emerged only against the backdrop of an assumption that there is no neces-
sarily existent omniscient being.
Warfi eld (1997) argues in the following way for the compatibility of divine 
foreknowledge and human freedom. (Let P = Jones φs in a.d. 2000 and 
Jones could have refrained from φ-ing in a.d. 2000, Q = It was true at the 
beginning of time that Jones φs in a.d. 2000, G = God exists, O = God is 
omniscient, and K = God knows at the beginning of time that Jones φs in 
a.d. 2000.)
(1) ?(G & O) Premise
(2) ◊(P & Q) Premise
(3) ?(Q ⊃ (G & O)) 1, classical logic
(4) ?((◊(P & Q) & ?(Q ⊃ (G & O))) ⊃ ◊(P & (G & O))) Necessary Truth
(5) ◊(P & (G & O)) 2,3,4 classical logic
(6) ?((P & (G & O)) ⊃ K) Premise
(7) ◊(P & (G & (O & K))) 5,6 classical logic
The conclusion, (7), is the claim that it is possible for Jones to φ in a.d. 
2000 freely (i.e., Jones does φ then while he could, at the same time, have 
refrained from doing so) even though God knew at the beginning of time 
that he would φ in a.d. 2000.
Warfi eld’s argument is fl awed. (6) seems wholly uncontroversial. It 
says that necessarily if P is true and God exists and is omniscient, then 
God knew at the beginning of time that P. (1), on the other hand, is quite 
controversial. But suppose we accept (1). What grounds do we have for 
accepting (2)? Warfi eld says:
76 Faith and Philosophy
The problem of logical fatalism has been solved. That is, almost ev-
eryone will agree that, for example, the following two propositions 
are consistent:
(a) Plantinga will freely climb Mount Rushmore in a.d. 2000
(b) It was true in a.d. 50 that Plantinga will climb Mount Rush-
more in a.d. 2000
(b), of course, implies that
(c) Plantinga will climb Mount Rushmore in a.d. 2000
but casts no doubt on Plantinga’s power to refrain from so doing. If 
Plantinga were to refrain from climbing, (b) would not have been 
true, but this does not, the refutations of fatalism assure us, require 
Plantinga to have objectionable “power over the past.” (Warfi eld 
1997, p. 80)
Warfi eld’s support for premise (2) then seems to be the fact that “the 
problem of logical fatalism has been solved.” That is, he claims to sup-
port premise (2) by pointing to the philosophical community and saying, 
“Look, see, the philosophical community agrees that (a) and (b) are com-
possible, therefore it is legitimate for me to appeal to it in an argument for 
the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom.” In his 
reply to Anthony Brueckner’s critique of his argument in “On Freedom 
and Foreknowledge: A Reply to Two Critics” Warfi eld says:
I did not in any way endorse the “strategy” that Brueckner att ributes 
to me. What I did say in presenting my argument is this: “I assume 
that fatalism is false and not merely that the arguments for it are un-
persuasive” (p.84, note 3). I take logical fatalism to be the doctrine that 
true future tensed propositions about human action are incompatible 
with free performance of these actions. The falsity of this position, 
then, implies that free action is compatible with true future tensed 
propositions describing the actions (and does not merely imply that 
certain arguments for the fatalist position are unpersuasive).
Is it in any way dialectically inappropriate to assume the falsity of 
logical fatalism in providing my argument for theological compati-
bilism? I don’t think it is. Aft er all, as noted both in my earlier article 
and again in reply to Professor Hasker, I know of no participant in 
the foreknowledge debate (compatibilist or incompatibilist) who 
does not accept the falsity of logical fatalism. Relevant interlocutors 
therefore have no room to disagree with this assumption. (Warfi eld 
2000, pp. 257–58)
Pace Warfi eld, it is dialectically inappropriate to assume the falsity of logi-
cal fatalism in providing his argument for theological compatibilism. If 
one accepts (1), i.e., if one accepts that it is a necessary truth that God 
exists and is omniscient, then there is no separate question of the truth of 
logical fatalism independent of the question of whether human freedom is 
compatible with God’s omniscience. That is, if (1) is true, then the question 
of whether logical fatalism is false just is the question of whether human 
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freedom is compatible with God’s omniscience. Discussions of logical fa-
talism in the philosophical literature bracket the question of the truth of 
(1). In other words, discussions of logical fatalism proceed on the assump-
tion that (1) is false. Thus, if (1) is true, employing (2) in an argument for 
(7) is all so much begging the question. If (1) is false, then Warfi eld’s argu-
ment is unsound.
To make more vivid how Warfi eld’s argument is fl awed consider a 
structurally analogous argument oﬀ ered as a response to the traditional 
problem of evil. (Let P = there is some unnecessary and undeserved suﬀ er-
ing in the world, G = God exists, and O = God is omniscient, omnipotent, 
and omnibenevolent.)
(1*) ?(G & O) Premise
(2*) ◊P Premise
(3*) ?(P ⊃ (G & O)) 1, classical logic
(4*) ?((◊P & ?(P ⊃ (G & O))) ⊃ ◊(P & (G & O))) Necessary Truth
(5*) ◊(P & (G & O)) 2,3 classical logic
Suppose someone—let’s call him Smith—gave this argument for the 
compatibility of the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibe-
nevolent God and the existence of unnecessary and undeserved suﬀ ering 
and oﬀ ered as his support for (2*) the fact that in his philosophical com-
munity everyone accepts that it is possible for there to be unnecessary 
and undeserved suﬀ ering. Suppose that within that community some 
philosophers had argued that on the basis of non-theological consider-
ations it was impossible that there be any unnecessary and undeserved 
suﬀ ering. Though the consensus of that philosophical community is that 
those arguments are bad and that it is possible for there to be unnecessary 
and undeserved suﬀ ering, it would be dialectically out of place for Smith 
to appeal to that consensus as his support for (2*) given that he is assum-
ing (1*) in his argument. The consensus of the philosophical community 
that it is possible that there be unnecessary and undeserved suﬀ ering is 
a consensus that brackets the question of the existence of an omniscient, 
omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God. If those in the philosophical com-
munity who accept that it is possible for there to be unnecessary and 
undeserved suﬀ ering don’t even consider the possibility of the necessary 
existence of an omniscient, omnibenevolent, and omnipotent God, then 
appealing to their acceptance of this possibility in an att empt to resolve 
the problem of evil surely is not kosher. Either (1*) is true, in which case, 
their case for the possibility of unnecessary and undeserved suﬀ ering 
is incomplete without an answer to the traditional problem of evil and, 
thus, (2*) of Smith’s argument is wholly unsupported, or (1*) is false, in 
which case, Smith’s argument is unsound.
Warfi eld’s argument for the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and 
human freedom is in just as bad shape as is Smith’s resolution of the prob-
lem of evil. Both should be rejected.
University of Massachusett s, Amherst
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